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The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) media strategy is a successful one. It has enabled a small group of social 
media users to amplify impressions of the organization far beyond its actual effect, capturing global attention. This 
terrorist group has proven quite effective in using Twitter to spread their evil ideas, recruit followers and post obscene 
videos depicting the most egregious cruelty imaginable. In this exploratory research, an observational research was 
undertaken to explore the strategies and tactics deployed by the group in their use of Twitter. The results show that 
ISIS has successfully utilized this social media platform as a tool to achieve its goals and implement its media strategy. 
Keywords: ISIS Twitter, Islamic state media, ISIS social media, Islamic E-Caliphate, counterterrorism 
intelligence. 
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 تنكم . ي�بك دحل ةحجان يعامتجلاا لصاوتلا  عقاوم لىع ةيملاع إلاا ةيملاس إلاا ةلودلا ميظنت ةيجيتا ت�سا ب�تعت
 نم  ي�ثكب  ب�كأ  ةمظنملا  هذه مجح ميخضت نم لصاوتلا  عقاوم  يمدختسم نم ة ي�غص ةعومجم ةيجيتا ت�سلاا  هذه
 ن ي�عباتلا دينجت ةيناطيشلا راكفلاا ش�نل ت�يوت عقوم مادختسا ي ن� ةيلاع ةيلعاف ي ب�اهر إلاا ميظنتلا اذه تبثأ . يلىعفلا اهمجح ةبقارم  للاخ نم ي ن�اشكتسا  ثحب نع ةرابع  وه ثحبلا  اذه  .ةيشحولا  لامع
ألاا  سىقأ  لىع يوتحت  ي ت�لا  داوملا  ش�نو عقومل ميظنتلا اذه مادختسا تايلآ فاشكتسا لجأ نم ميظنتلا اذه راصنأ نم ةراتخم ةعومجم تاديرغت ليلحتو
 بنجت لجأ نم ميظنتلا اهمدختسي ي ت�لا ةيل
آلااو ت�يوت عقومل ي ب�اهر إلاا ميظنتلا تامادختسا مها جئاتنلا ترهظأ . ت�يوت
.هيصرانم تاباسح قلاغإ
 لصاوتلا عقاوم , فرطتلا ةحفاكم , باهر إلاا ةحفاكم , ةيملاسلاا ةلودلا ميظنت , شعادل ةينو ت�كللاا ةفلاخلا , شعاد :ةيحاتفملا تاملكلا
. باهر إلااو يعامتجلاا
Background
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the 
plethora of terrorist groups and paramilitary organiza-
tions that emerged from instability in Iraq. Its opera-
tions permeated the Syrian border (particularly after 
2011) and achieved particular notoriety after the rout 
of the Iraqi army in Mosul in June 2014nseized a great 
volume of military hardware that greatly enhanced its 
military capabilities and potential political legitimacy. 
This is particularly important  given the immense his-
torical and geostrategic importance of Mosul Prov-
ince (Stanton et al., 2015). Consequently it was em-
boldened to announce the restoration of the Islamic 
Caliphate three weeks later, under the leadership of 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In addition to its logistical dif-
ferentiation from conventional terrorist groups and 
sectarian militias, ISIS presents a qualitative evolution 
of the al-Qaeda model with a more professional strat-
egy, which incorporates a practical model for social 
governance (Lister, 2014). 
Al-Qaeda style groups and terrorist organizations in 
general have been universally denounced from the 
outset by Islamic clerics and mainstream religious es-
tablishments as a criminal aberration, such as in the 
Amman Message of 2006, and the more recent spe-
cific and comprehensive refutation of ISIS issued by 
the respected Sheikh Mohammad Al-Yaqoubi (2015), 
an opponent of the Syrian regime as well as terror-
ist groups. Nevertheless, the declaration by ISIS of an 
“Islamic State” as a tangible geopolitical phenomenon 
with the potential to dramatically transform the geo-
political setting of the Middle East appeared to give 
hope of redressing the grievances of many discon-
tented people arising from political oppression, neo-
colonialism and poor socio-economic development, 
which apparently overrode conventional norms and 
inspired an influx of young jihadists from around the 
world (Jabareen, 2015; Wood, 2015). 
ISIS use of social media 
Terrorist groups have used various means of media 
through history, and recently they have focused 
on the internet and social media tools (Crilley, 
2001; Jacopson, 2010; Ogun, 2012; Lister, 2014; 
Shane and Hubbard, 2014; Chatfield, Reddick and 
Brajawidagna, 2015). Social media has become a 
vital part of modern news and conflict, making it the 
informational weapon of choice for terrorist groups, 
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especially ISIS (Nissen, 2015). ISIS has succeeded in 
establishing territorial authority due to its successful 
recruitment of personnel by media propagation and 
its brute terror to consolidate control (Cronin, 2016). 
ISIS declared a Caliphate in the areas under its control 
across Iraq and Syria in 2014, seizing the advantage 
of domestic civil and sectarian cleavages in the Arab 
World since 2011, with polarizing regional stressors. 
ISIS is able to translate military victories into political 
success through an extensive and pro-active social 
media campaign, which has been widely recognized 
as superior among professional organizations (Lewis, 
2014). Its use of Twitter has been particularly effective 
in disseminating its evil ideas, recruiting followers 
and posting outrageous content such as videos of 
decapitations and amputations by which it seeks to 
demonstrate its authority (Stern and Berger, 2015). 
ISIS members use social media both to communicate 
with one another and to recruit new supporters and 
members. Consequently the Department of Homeland 
Security in the US has expanded its inspection of 
social-media posts as part of its visa application 
process, and it is actively considering additional ways 
to incorporate the use of social media review in other 
programs (Paletta and Hughes, 2015). ISIS has an 
extremely large and powerful social media campaign 
and presence on Twitter that consists primarily of a 
few hundred effective accounts and thousands more 
accounts tweeting only a few times before being 
suspended for violation of the terms of use. The ISIS 
media strategy is considered a success because of 
this efficiency, whereby a small group of social media 
users can exploit the slow responsiveness of social 
media sites to effectively  disseminate information 
that amplify impressions of the organization far 
beyond its actual effect (Berger and Morgan, 2015). It 
is able to do this by the astute use of hashtags (Lister, 
2014; Milmo, 2014). Finally, the reach of social media 
and the Internet enables ISIS to mobilize supporters 
from all over the world, and to continu¬ously refill its 
ranks with fresh volunteers (Eisenstadt, 2014). 
Research justification and contribution 
While some Western studies have recently analyzed 
the use of social media by ISIS (Berger and Morgan, 
2015; Berger and Perez, 2016), very few studies have 
analyzed their Arabic accounts. Although the majority 
of Arabs and Muslims view the group as a terrorist 
death cult, ISIS itself attempts to justify itself on 
religious grounds, entailing a contextual analysis of 
its tactics (Wood, 2015). As noted by McCants (2015), 
ISIS is careful to presents its vision (i.e. propaganda) 
in Arabic, written in classical language and drawing 
on traditional concepts in an attempt to legitimize 
its otherwise untenable ideology. Accordingly, 
understanding its beliefs and tactics requires a 
guide proficient in Islamic theology and Arabic 
language, to counteract its chief ideologues who 
are mainly Arabs (Saltman and Winter, 2014). They 
speak in codes and allusions whose meanings may 
be lost for those unfamiliar with specific traditions 
and texts of traditional Islam. As a consequence, it 
is very important for Arabic-speaking researchers to 
observe their Arabic effective accounts and analyze 
their tweets in order to understand their theology 
and strategies. Therefore, this research can contribute 
to international efforts aiming to fight this terrorist 
group. 
Methodology
Epistemology
This research utilized the qualitative approach of 
online participant observation, a new ethnographic 
method suitable for online studies called 'netnogra-
phy' (Kozinets, 2015). Thirty effective Twitter accounts 
belonging to ISIS supporters were selected and fol-
lowed in order to uncover ISIS supporters’ tactics of 
using Twitter. Traditional ethnography suffers barriers 
in accessing social settings relevant to the research 
problem (Bryman, 2008; Hesse-Biber, Nagy and Leavy, 
2010), but netnography typically circumvents this as 
anyone can follow any account on Twitter without the 
permission of the account owner. 
The researcher assumed a covert role, not disclosing 
the fact that he is a researcher (Browne, 2005; Bryman, 
2008). The researcher’s role is based on Gold’s (1958) 
classification of participant observer roles, namely 
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the “complete observer” who does not interact 
with subjects. Qualitative research usually applies “a 
general approach of beginning with general research 
questions” (Bryman, 2008, p. 417); this research 
began with the general research question of What are 
ISIS tactics in using Twitter and why do they use it?
Design 
Thirty ISIS supporters’ accounts each having more 
than 2000 followers were selected. This research was 
undertaken over a period of one month (June 1st 
to July 1st, 2015). Captured tweets were analyzed 
through thematic analysis and daily notes were made. 
The research design is illustrated in figure (1). 
Sample
Purposive sampling, which “can provide reliable and 
robust data” (Tongco, 2007, p 154), was used in this 
research to identify the subjects: 30 ISIS-supporting 
accounts with more than 2000 followers in each Twit-
ter. Sample characteristics were defined as being ISIS 
supporters with more than 2000 followers. 
Data analysis
Captured tweets were analyzed using thematic analy-
sis approach, which is one of the most common ap-
proaches used for qualitative data analysis (Bryman, 
2008). Based on the thematic analysis, all tweets 
collected were coded in order to identify repeated 
themes. Furthermore, the researcher’s daily notes, 
written down after noting something interesting, 
were taken into account when extracting results. 
Results
Through observing ISIS Twitter accounts and thematic 
analysis, the researcher managed to define the follow-
ing:
A. How ISIS can keep their effective accounts 
active regardless of the international efforts 
to suspend them. 
B. Their security policy when using social me-
dia.
C. The main uses of Twitter by ISIS.
A. Keeping effective accounts active methodology 
ISIS uses a unique method of keeping their key ac-
counts active which explains why it is very difficult for 
Twitter and security enforcement agencies to suspend 
these accounts. The method consists of the steps ex-
Figure (1): Research design
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plained below and shown in figures (2) and (3):
• Opening a new account similar to the 
current account name through leaving 
the same letters and changing numbers 
in a sequential way. 
• Account owners announce the new 
backup account and ask followers to fol-
low this account without tweeting from 
the backup account. 
• When the original account is suspended, 
the account owner starts using the back-
up account. 
• The backup account owner follows other 
major ISIS accounts, whose accounts 
owners follow the backup account and 
ask their followers to support the new 
account. 
• The backup account becomes main ac-
count and the process starts again.
Figure (2): Keeping effective accounts active methodology
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B. ISIS security policy when using social media
ISIS effective accounts keep asking their supporters to 
be cautious and to do the following:
• Not to trust anyone on the Internet, 
especially as some intelligence agencies 
open Twitter accounts pretending that 
they are ISIS supporters to try to spread 
rumors. 
• Not to give any location-identifying 
information for anyone. 
• Not to activate GPS in mobiles. 
• Preparing backup accounts to be ready 
when primary accounts get suspended.
C. Main uses of Twitter by ISIS
Through thematic analysis, it was obvious that the 
terrorist organization uses Twitter mainly to achieve 
the following objectives.
1. Wage their ideological battle ISIS 
draws strength from the climate that 
fomented its emergence, namely the 
complex circumstances causing the 
failure of the states of Iraq and Syria, 
including domestic civil and sectarian 
cleavages, authoritarian leadership 
and polarizing regional stressors. ISIS 
uses Twitter to spread its propaganda, 
explain its objectives, ideas and news, 
succeed in convincing many naïve 
Sunni Muslims that justice can only be 
achieved by supporting ISIS (particularly 
in Iraq, where Iranian hegemony made 
the Iraqi state a tool of Shia sectarianism 
seeking revenge from Arab Sunnis after 
2003). Governments are held to be 
oppressive apostates, while other Sunni 
paramilitary/terrorist organizations are 
presented as effete hypocrites.     
2. Force multiplication ISIS is trying to 
multiply its force through the use of 
social media in order to present itself 
as more powerful than it may actually 
be by the aggressive dissemination of 
online content, especially when they 
face defeat on the ground  to put a 
positive spin on events. This serves two 
purposes: gaining mass-media attention 
Figure (3): Back-up accounts using the same letters and changing numbers in a sequen-
 tial way
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and getting more followers. 
3. Existence of a tangible state and 
establishing legitimacy ISIS tries to 
ensure that its religious justification is 
robust and to establish its legitimacy 
over other jihadi groups. It uses Twitter 
to attack its religious competitors such as 
al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Muslim 
Brotherhood (including Hamas). Figure 
(4) shows an advertising a campaign in 
Twitter against Hamas under the title of 
“Hamas is capturing [i.e. imprisoning] 
Salafis,” referring to the followers of the 
Salafist Islamic movement with which 
ISIS identifies (Reese, 2012). 
Salafism is an ultra-Orthodox refinement of 
the Hanbalite reformist movement launched 
by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, known 
as Wahhabism in the West, which has been 
the official school of the Saudi state since the 
18th century. Reflecting its long history of 
providing religious legitimacy for successive 
Saudi regimes, Salafism heavily emphasizes 
Islamic doctrines affirming obedience and 
loyalty to the government. While senior 
Salafist scholars disagreed with the Saudi 
support for the Gulf War in 1990 they never 
ceased to urge obedience. (It should be noted 
that Salafist scholars have been the most 
persistent critics of terrorism and terrorist 
actions, particularly suicide bombing when 
it emerged in the Palestinian resistance of 
the 1990s.) Consequently, they are generally 
viewed as regime stooges (‘scholars for 
dollars’) by more militant Salafists such as al-
Qaeda and their successors, as well as some 
more mainstream Muslim organizations such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The disconnect between the denunciation 
of terrorism by every reputed Islamic scholar 
and the victims of ISIS recruitment being se-
duced by their ideology lies in the percep-
tion that the official institutions of Islam have 
been coopted by the oppressive neocolonial 
regimes who are the primary target of al-
Qaeda style groups, making any attempt at 
de-radicalization based on state control of 
religion counter-productive (On Contact: The 
Perversion of Islam with Hamza Yusuf, 2016). 
Figure (4): Advertising a campaign against Hamas entitled “Hamas is capturing Salafis”I
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Conversely, ISIS draws on the long tradition 
of obedience to the “Islamic state” historically 
promulgated by scholars in the Arab World 
to justify obedience to itself, purporting to 
provide the accoutrements of a genuine state 
to its “citizens”, such as education, health and 
economic services. 
4. Enlisting new members ISIS primarily 
uses Twitter to promote its ideologies, 
part of which is information warfare 
whereby it seeks to promote its success-
es on the battlefield while denouncing 
the atrocities of its enemies to gain sym-
pathy. They particularly enjoy showing 
the supposed benefits of suicide bomb-
ings, such as showing images of dead 
bombers smiling as if they see paradise. 
Based on subsequent reactions and 
comments, ISIS begins to identify peo-
ple who are sympathetic with them and 
exchange direct messages with them as 
the first stage of recruitment, trying to 
convince them to join the group, commit 
a terrorist act or provide other assistance 
to terrorist activities in their own coun-
tries, which is the way  ISIS becomes 
complicit in lone wolf attacks in West-
ern countries. Lone wolf attacks diverge 
from traditional political violence in their 
intersection with personal psychoses; 
that is mentally disturbed and socially 
alienated individuals who find expres-
sion for their manias in Internet ideolo-
gies such as Islamism or neo-Nazism that 
seduce  isolated individuals with terror-
ist tendencies and  can ultimately guide 
them to commit terroristic acts (Simon, 
2013). The process by which ISIS enlists 
new members is displayed in figure (5).
5. Strategic use of fear In this tactic, the 
group creates a pervasive climate of fear 
as a force multiplier (Vinci, 2005). The 
basic tactic of ISIS is to make a surprise 
attack, inflict maximum casualties, 
spread fear, and then withdraws without 
suffering heavy losses. Members of ISIS 
then broadcast their brutal acts such 
as beheading and burning people 
alive, and wait for their opponents and 
unsympathetic locals to evacuate or flee 
from the previously attacked territory. 
This harrying strategy explains the use 
of gratuitous violence by the group 
and their dissemination of horrific 
photos and videos as part of a shock-
and-awe campaign that derives the 
Figure (5): Recruitment process
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 Figure (6): “An important lesson for the
supporters to learn and implement: [kid-
napping and assassination]”I
Figure (7): Checking hyperlinks for virusesI
maximum emotive value from military 
resources deployment. Therefore, their 
use of violence is not random but 
strategic, aiming to literally terrorize the 
inhabitants of certain areas they wish to 
control to flee, leaving only willing or 
coerced supporters. This strategy makes 
the holding phase easier to realize. It can 
be concluded that this strategic use of 
fear was used for propaganda purposes 
in addition for controlling the territory 
captured. 
6. Provide training materials to their 
supporters The jihadists’ tech skills 
are undeniable. Nearly every day their 
effective accounts Tweet posts offering 
tutorials on encryption, phishing and 
securing messaging. They use Twitter 
to provide information security training 
to their supporters, in addition to other 
training materials such as a lessons on 
hijacking and assassination, as shown 
in figure (6), which provides a link to 
the justpaste.it website billed as an 
important lesson for supporters to 
learn and implement: kidnapping and 
assassination. Another example shown 
in figure (7) provides a hyperlink to the 
dump.to website for checking hyperlinks 
for viruses.
7. Wage electronic battles Members 
of ISIS  wage what they call electronic 
battles from time to time, following 
certain steps. First, they determine the 
exact time and the electronic content 
they need to distribute. After that, they 
define the targeted hash tags, which 
are usually active hash tags that belong 
to the targeted country or audience, as 
illustrated in figure (8), which is a tweet 
that defines an ISIS report about services 
provided in Palmyra city as the intended 
electronic content, and also it defines 
some active hash tags, mainly in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Taking the previous results into account, it’s clear 
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Figure (8): How to wage electronic battles
Figure (9): ISIS method of waging electronic battles
that the method of waging electronic battles for ISIS 
has three fundamental stages, as illustrated below in 
figure (9).
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Summary and recommendations  
ISIS so far has succeeded in their media strategy. The 
terrorist group has proven quite effective in using 
Twitter to achieve some strategic goals, such as en-
listing new members, spreading their ideology, pro-
viding training materials to their supporters and more 
importantly using fear strategically for propaganda 
purposes in addition to capturing and controlling 
new territories. The terrorist group has a clear meth-
odology in keeping its major accounts active and in 
keeping a security policy. . Furthermore, the terrorist 
group uses hash tag marketing effectively. 
ISIS is also trying to prove the existence of a state in 
the captured territories that provide all required ser-
vices to citizens, such as education, health and eco-
nomic welfare services. ISIS wants to prove that it has 
a strong infrastructure and many services for families 
who are willing to migrate to its “Caliphate”. 
ISIS is trying hard to ensure that its religious legiti-
macy is robust; therefore counter-messaging efforts 
should focus on theological challenges and on expos-
ing the inherent brutality of the group. Based on the 
above, this research recommends the following tech-
niques and actions to combat ISIS in social media:
• It is essential for mainstream religious 
preaching and propagation to be trans-
ferred from the mosque to social media, 
which is the true battleground of their 
ideological war. 
• It is very important for moderate Islamic 
countries to get into direct ideological 
arguments with ISIS supporters on Twit-
ter, with the establishment of a special 
unit to generate and disseminate coun-
ter-messages. 
• It is very important for Muslim families to 
be aware of their responsibilities towards 
their children by safeguarding them 
against ISIS and its dangerous activities 
and ideologies. 
• There should be an international entity 
to organize electronic content on the 
internet and oversee issues related to 
international legislation. 
Counter-messaging efforts should focus 
Conclusion
on the main weaknesses of ISIS, which are its spurious 
religious justification and egregious carnage.
Research limitations and further research
The major limitation of this study was that Twitter 
suspended many accounts during the observation 
period; while this is to be welcomed, it prevents ob-
taining complete data for the purposes of this study. 
Future research should focus on testing the efficiency 
of counter-messaging. Researchers can observe differ-
ent counter-messaging accounts for different coun-
tries and analyze and compare their efforts in com-
bating ISIS ideologically. Future research may develop 
a suggested counter-messaging framework as guid-
ance for combating ISIS and other terrorist organiza-
tions through social media.
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